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This paper develops an equilibrium search and matching model to jointly study the
aggregate, sectoral, and distributional impacts of labour adjustment. The model ex-
tends Pissarides (2000) to include multisector production and search and ‘innovation’
from investments that can potentially improve a match’s productivity. These exten-
sions deliver two mechanisms for inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral labour reallocation
after shocks. First, because workers search simultaneously in multiple sectors, changes
in labour market conditions in one sector propagate to impact wages and hiring in
the rest of the economy through a reservation wage eﬀect. Second, a positive pro-
ductivity shock causes ﬁrms to invest more resources in innovation. This innovation
eﬀect shifts production towards high-skill jobs and ampliﬁes the impact of productivity
shocks relative to the baseline model. I show that the model is useful for analyzing
labour adjustments caused by a diverse set of factors including: technological change;
persistent energy price and exchange rate shocks; and trade liberalization. Finally, be-
cause the transition dynamics between steady-states are tractable, the model can be
readily-applied to the data to study particular labour adjustment episodes.
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Recent empirical evidence ﬁnds that sectoral job changes are common and have increased
signiﬁcantly in recent decades.1 These ﬁndings raise several issues. For individuals, these
job changes typically result in earnings losses that can be large and persistent, particularly
for those with intervening unemployment spells.2 Furthermore, the factors driving sectoral
reallocation — such as technological change; persistent energy and exchange rate movements;
and trade liberalization — often have diﬀerent eﬀects on low-skill and high-skill workers. At
the aggregate level, given the large diﬀerences in sectoral output per worker, reallocation can
have important impacts on output and productivity as well as equilibrium wage spillovers
among sectors.3
Existing approaches fail to jointly capture these important features of sectoral labour
reallocation in a uniﬁed, tractable framework that explicitly considers transition dynamics.
This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap in the literature by developing a model to study the
aggregate, sectoral, and distributional impacts of labour adjustment following unanticipated,
sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks. I solve the model, derive the main analytical results and
use simple quantitative examples to clearly illustrate the model’s adjustment mechanisms.
I then demonstrate that the model’s results are consistent with facts from sectoral labour
adjustments caused by a variety of factors. In addition, the model’s transition dynamics are
quite tractable, which facilitates applying the model to the data.
The model makes two key extensions to the baseline Pissarides (2000) labour search
and matching model, where search frictions generate equilibrium unemployment. The ﬁrst
extension is multisector production and search, which delivers equilibrium wage spillovers
across sectors. The second extension is an ‘innovation’ process that allows matches to acquire
skills and become more productive. This extension parsimoniously models low-skill and high-
skill workers in this environment to analyze how they might be impacted diﬀerently by shocks.
Including the innovation process is also useful because it ampliﬁes the model’s response to
1Kambourov and Manovskii (forthcoming) ﬁnd that more than 10 percent of U.S. workers change sectors
annually. Sectoral labour mobility more than doubled from 6 percent to 14 percent per year, over 1968–1997.
2For U.S. evidence, see e.g. McLaughlin and Bils (2001), Fallick (1996), Jacobson et al. (1993), Topel
(1993). For Canadian evidence, see Morissette et al. (2007) and Galarneau and Stratychuk (2002).
3For aggregate impacts see Lee and Wolpin (2006); Tapp (2007) studies Canada following a global com-
modity price shock; for sectoral impacts, see Treﬂer (2004) for Canadian manufacturing industries responses
following the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement; Beaudry et al. (2007) ﬁnd that changes in sectoral com-
position cause equilibrium wage spillovers.
1productivity shocks and captures how reallocation within a sector can impact aggregate
output and productivity.
While the model retains the well-studied features (and short-comings) of the basic one-
sector model without innovation investment, the extensions provide some important new
insights from two mechanisms that generate inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral reallocation of
workers during labour adjustments. Inter-sectoral reallocation operates through a reservation
wage eﬀect, which describes how changes in workers’ outside options cause sector-speciﬁc
shocks to spillover to other sectors. In the model, workers search simultaneously in multiple
sectors of the economy. Therefore, when a shock changes labour market conditions in one
sector, this aﬀects workers’ value of search, causing them to update their reservation (and
ultimately, their bargained) wages. This changes the cost of labour, which in turn, impacts
proﬁtability and, therefore, job creation in other sectors of the economy. The varied recruiting
responses in diﬀerent sectors result in inter-sectoral labour reallocation.
Workers not only move between sectors after productivity shocks, they can also move
within a sector, as ﬁrms substitute between low and high-skill production. This intra-sectoral
labour reallocation operates through an innovation eﬀect. In the model, all new matches
begin production as low-skill, but may become high-skill through a costly and uncertain
productivity-enhancing investment. After a positive productivity shock in a sector, employing
a high-skill worker becomes relatively more proﬁtable, so ﬁrms expect a larger return from
these investments. They respond by investing more resources into innovation with their low-
skill workers. This accelerates skill acquisition, endogenously raises the share of high-skill
production in the sector and ampliﬁes the model’s response to productivity shocks.
The reason this general model is relevant for sectoral labour adjustments driven by various
factors is the following: While the precise causes of sectoral reallocation are speciﬁc to the
particular episode under study, the consequences are quite uniﬁed across episodes. Regardless
of the exact shock, it ultimately changes the relative proﬁtability of production across certain
sectors. In sectors where production becomes more proﬁtable, there is relatively more entry,
and over time, employment increases. Typically, a positive shock makes high-skill production
in these sectors more attractive, so more resources are devoted to productivity-improving,
innovative eﬀorts to chase these new proﬁts. This results in relatively more high-skill produc-
tion and rewards these high-skill workers with larger wage gains. In the model, sector-speciﬁc
productivity shocks capture these eﬀects quite well by changing the relative match surpluses
2across and within sectors to generate the labour reallocation observed in the data.
Several studies relate to the model developed here. In the search and matching litera-
ture, Albrecht et al. (2006a) and Acemoglu (2001) consider two-sector production. However,
while my paper focuses on the impacts of productivity shocks for sectoral adjustment in the
steady-state and transition, these paper focus on a diﬀerent issue — the impacts of labour
market policies (unemployment beneﬁts, minimum wages, severance and payroll taxes) on
the sectoral composition in the steady-state. In Acemoglu (2001), there are no productivity
diﬀerences between workers within a sector, so distributional considerations are absent and
the transition is not considered. Albrecht et al. (2006a) consider steady-state distributional
eﬀects, but not transition dynamics. Other approaches in the international trade litera-
ture model sectoral reallocation.4 These models typically ignore unemployment and labour
market frictions. They also compare long-run, steady-state changes and overlook transition
dynamics. Finally, none of these papers model productivity-enhancing investment and skill
acquisition.
The outline for the remainder of the paper is as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the
model and transition dynamics. Section 4 quantitatively illustrates the model’s mechanisms.
Section 5 argues that the model is consistent with key characteristics of sectoral labour
adjustments and Section 6 concludes. Proofs and derivations are in the Appendix.
2 Multisector Search Model with Innovation
This section presents a model of labour reallocation following unanticipated sector-speciﬁc
shocks. The model adopts the search and matching framework, which is a standard tool
macroeconomists use to analyze labour market ﬂuctuations.5 In this environment, search
frictions imply that ﬁrms and workers use resources and take time to locate partners before
new production can begin. This search process results in equilibrium unemployment. I add
two key extensions relative to the baseline model of Pissarides (2000, Ch. 1). The ﬁrst is
4Melitz (2003) is a prominent example featuring intra-sectoral reallocation that can be contrasted with the
innovation eﬀect here. In Melitz’s model increasing trade exposure improves a sector’s productivity through
selection eﬀects. My model features within-ﬁrm productivity improvements, which aggregate to change the
sectoral composition of production. The ‘Dutch disease’ literature models inter-sectoral reallocation, but not
due to changes in workers reservation wages. Corden (1984) summarizes earlier contributions.
5This approach was developed by Diamond (1982a,b); Mortensen (1982a,b); Pissarides (1979, 1985); and
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), among others. Pissarides (2000) provides a thorough overview of the basic
model and various extensions. Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) and Yashiv (2006) survey the recent
labour market search literature.
3multisector production and search which eﬀectively links labour market conditions across
sectors and generates sectoral wage and hiring spillovers (inter-sectoral labour reallocation).
The second extension is a process I call ‘innovation’ and skill acquisition. This formalizes
the idea that acquiring skills in a job typically involves a costly investment process where
successful skill acquisition is uncertain and the match-speciﬁc component of the skills are not
transferable to new jobs. Including innovation ampliﬁes the model’s response to productivity
shocks through endogenous shifts in the skill-intensity of production (intra-sectoral labour
reallocation). Unlike previous multisector versions of the model, I focus not only on the
steady-state, but also on transition dynamics between steady-states. I also allow for sector-
speciﬁc separation rates and use sector-speciﬁc matching functions to capture the fact that
job-ﬁnding and job-ﬁlling rates vary signiﬁcantly by sector.
2.1 Environment and General Overview
The following is a general overview of the model’s key ingredients and timing of events. The
details are made explicit in subsequent sections. I focus ﬁrst on the steady-state, so there is
initially no aggregate uncertainty; later sections consider shocks and transition dynamics.
Time is discrete with an inﬁnite horizon. There are multiple sectors of the economy
indexed by i ∈ {1,2,...,I} that produce a non-storable good. The model features two types
of agents: workers and ﬁrms. Each type of agent is ex ante identical, inﬁnitely-lived and
risk-neutral, discounting future payoﬀs at rate δ. There will be heterogeneity ex post in the
sectors in which agents work and their match skill levels, based on the luck associated with
job search and skill acquisition. Agents are either matched and productive, or searching for
a partner to begin production.
Figure 1 describes the timing of events in a given period for unmatched agents. A re-
cruiting stage begins the period when unemployed workers collect unemployment beneﬁts
and search for jobs, and ﬁrms post vacancies in decentralized labour markets. The matching
stage follows when a subset of ﬁrms with vacancies and unemployed workers are brought
together in pairwise matches. Once matched, the pair bargain over the worker’s wage and
the ﬁrm decides how much innovation to engage in. If there is agreement, the pair produce
next period as a low-skill match.
Figure 2 describes the timing for producing agents. Production begins the period and
wage payments follow. Firms in low-skill matches then attempt to innovate to improve their
4productivity. At the end of each period, some low-skill matches successfully acquire match-
speciﬁc skills and become high-skill. Also at the end of the period, some low and high-skill
matches terminate exogenously.
2.2 Workers
The labour force consists of a measure one continuum of potential workers. At any point in
time, a given worker is in one of the following (2 × I + 1) states: Unemployed — receiving
unemployment beneﬁts, z, and searching for a job; or, working — receiving a wage in sector i
in a low-skill match of wL
i or in high-skill match of wH
i . The expected present values in these
states are denoted U, W L
i and W H
i , respectively. Workers maximize the expected present
value of their lifetime income subject to the random arrival of job oﬀers when unemployed.
The unemployed search for jobs at no cost. As a result, their search is not directed to
a particular sector, but rather simultaneous in all sectors.6 There is no on-the-job search
or quits.7 Workers do not value leisure. Therefore, when unemployed they allocate all their
time to search and when employed they inelastically supply one unit of labour each period.
There are no savings in the model; workers simply consume their current income.8
2.3 Firms
There is a large measure of potential ﬁrms. Firms can be in one of the following (3×I) states:
posting a vacancy to recruit in sector i; or producing in sector i in a low or high-skill job
match. The expected present values in these states are denoted Vi, JL
i and JH
i , respectively.
There is free entry and exit of vacancies and ﬁrms incur recruiting cost, c, each period
their vacancy remains unﬁlled. In a low-skill matches, ﬁrms engage in innovation activities,
xi ∈ R [0,1], at cost χ(xi) each period, where χ(0) = 0 and χ′(xi) > 0. Innovation is a
costly and uncertain process, where ﬁrms make a match-speciﬁc investment in an attempt
to improve the match’s productivity. This can be interpreted in several ways. First, it can
6The Appendix discusses directed search.
7Evidence from the U.S. and Canada ﬁnds a signiﬁcant number of workers who change sectors experi-
ence an intervening unemployment spell. For the U.S., see Kambourov and Manovskii (forthcoming) and
for Canada, see Osberg (1991). The model abstracts from job-to-job transitions, so all movements are be-
tween employment and unemployment. The assumption ruling out quits is innocuous because in equilibrium
workers’ wages compensate them for their value of search, so working in any sector is strictly preferred to
unemployment.
8Goods are not storable, so they have no value next period. Borrowing and lending contracts are ignored
because agents are risk neutral and no one will lend at a rate higher than r, so workers will not prefer
promised future consumption over current consumption because of discounting.
5represent the lower productivity of a new worker while learning match-speciﬁc skills. Second,
it can represent an on-the-job training program. Empirical evidence suggests training costs
can be substantial and are mainly paid by the ﬁrm.9 Third, it can represent research and
development (R&D) to improve the production technology. Innovation is beneﬁcial because
it makes skill acquisition more likely, reducing the expected time to become a high-skill
match. If innovation is successful, the match becomes high-skill, produces more and requires
no further innovation.
The model attempts to capture the fact that labour adjustments are typically costly for
individual workers. Empirical work ﬁnds that following job loss, workers can suﬀer signiﬁcant
and persistent earning losses in their subsequent jobs, particularly those workers with longer
tenure.10 These ﬁndings suggest that many skills which are accumulated are useful only in
the current match. As such, skills are modeled as match-speciﬁc, and therefore are lost when
the match terminates.
Matches produce output using only labour with constant returns to scale, skill-speciﬁc
technologies. Each period sector i matches produce: ySK
i = AipSK
i lSK
i , where y is output;
i ∈ {1,2,...,I} subscripts the sector; SK ∈ {L,H} superscripts low and high-skill matches;
Ai is a sector-speciﬁc parameter, which is constant and normalized to one in the steady state,
but will later serve as the shock; p is productivity, with pH
i > pL
i ; and l is labour. To simplify
the exposition, I assume each ﬁrm employs one worker.
2.4 Matching Process and Transitions Between States
Unmatched ﬁrms post vacancies to attract unemployed workers in one of I sectors. The
unemployed search simultaneously in all sectors. Search is costly for two reasons: 1) ﬁrms
explicitly use resources to attract workers; and 2) workers and ﬁrms implicitly forego the
higher wage earnings and proﬁts they would be receiving if they were matched. Search is
also time-consuming because each period some agents are unsuccessful in ﬁnding a match.
Sector-speciﬁc matching functions capture this feature by determining the measure of pairwise
matches per period in each sector. The matching functions have the Cobb-Douglas functional
9For estimates of investment costs see, for example, Barron et al. (1989, 1999); Bartel (1995); and Dolﬁn
(2006). Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) analyze National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data and ﬁnd
employers pay the explicit cost of on-site investment over 90 percent of the time.
10For U.S. evidence, see e.g. Fallick (1996), Jacobson et al. (1993), Topel (1993). For Canadian evidence,
see Galarneau and Stratychuk (2002) and Morissette et al. (2007).
6form:11 mi(u,vi) = µiuαv
1−α
i , where mi is the measure of sector i matches; u is the measure of
unemployed workers; vi is the measure of vacancies in sector i; µi is the recruiting eﬀectiveness
in sector i; and α is the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment.
Previous labour search papers with multiple sectors, such as Acemoglu (2001) and Davis
(2001), assume matching occurs through an aggregate matching function. The formulation
here is more general. Sectors are allowed to vary in their recruiting eﬀectiveness, µi’s, because
in some sectors assessing applicants is easier. This means that market tightness, and therefore
job-ﬁnding and job-ﬁlling rates, are allowed to vary by sector. This formulation brings the
model closer to the data which feature clear diﬀerences in search outcomes across sectors.12
Because of the model is set in discrete, rather than continuous time, this more general
matching process implies that workers could potentially receive multiple oﬀers in a period.
This is an interesting and complex issue, which is explored in detail in several recent pa-
pers.13 To keep the model’s labour adjustment mechanisms transparent and comparable to
the baseline Pissarides (2000) model, matching is determined in the following manner to avoid
multiple oﬀers. At the begin of the matching stage the number of matches in each sector is
determined. In each sector, these pairwise matches are randomly allocated. Once matched,
the pair exit to the bargaining stage. Deﬁne θi ≡
vi
u as market tightness in sector i from
the ﬁrm’s perspective; fi(θi) =
mi
u denotes an unemployed worker’s job-ﬁnding probability
in sector i;14 and qi(θi) =
mi
vi denotes the job-ﬁlling probability for a sector i vacancy, where
PI
i=1 fi(θi),q(θi) ∈ [0,1].
Each period, some matches change states. All sector i matches face exogenous probability
si of job destruction, where si is the sector i separation rate. Low-skill matches in sector i
become high-skill with probability λixi, where λi is the exogenous skill arrival rate and xi is
innovative investment.
11Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey the empirical literature on estimating matching functions. They
conclude that existing evidence generally supports the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation.
12U.S. data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and recent research by Davis et al. (2007),
for instance, ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity in vacancy-ﬁlling rates across sectors.
13See Julien et al. (2006) and Albrecht et al. (2006b) among others.
14The probability of matching in sector i is the product of the probability of ﬁnding a job and the probability







72.5 Value Functions in the Steady-State
In the steady-state, the worker’s Bellman equations are as follows. The expected present
value of being unemployed, U, is:









In the current period the worker receives unemployment beneﬁts. With probability fi(θi)
the worker matches with a ﬁrm and receives an oﬀer in sector i. In equilibrium she accepts
all job oﬀers,15 and thus will begin next period working as a low-skill match — the present
value of which is W L
i . δ discounts next period’s payoﬀs and the summation is over all sectors.
With complementary probability the worker does not match and remains unemployed.






i + δ[siU + λixiW
H
i + (1 − si − λixi)W
L
i ] (2)
The current return is the low-skill wage in sector i. With probability si, the match
separates and the worker becomes unemployed next period. With probability λixi, the match
acquires skill and produces next period as high-skill. With complementary probability the
worker keeps his current job.






i + δ[siU + (1 − si)W
H
i ] (3)
The worker receives the high-skill wage in the current period. The job terminates with
probability si, leaving the worker unemployed next period, otherwise the job continues.
The value functions for the ﬁrm are given by the following: The expected present value
of posting a sector i vacancy, Vi, is:
Vi = −c + δ[qi(θi)J
L
i + (1 − qi(θi))Vi] (4)
The ﬁrm incurs the recruiting cost in the current period. With probability qi(θi), the
job-ﬁlling rate, the ﬁrm matches with a worker and begins producing with a low-skill job
next period, else the ﬁrm continues recruiting.
15Section 2.9 derives the equilibrium wages, conﬁrming this assertion.












i + (1 − si − λixi)J
L
i ] (5)
The ﬁrst term is the ﬁrm’s current proﬁt: the ﬁrm produces output AipL
i , pays the worker
wage wL
i and provides investment of xi at cost χ(xi). The match separates with probability
si, leaving the ﬁrm with a vacancy next period. With probability λixi, the match becomes









i + δ[siVi + (1 − si)J
H
i ] (6)
The ﬁrm’s current proﬁt is its output less the wage since the ﬁrm no longer trains the
worker. With probability si, the match terminates becoming a vacancy next period, otherwise
high-skill production continues.
2.6 Wage Determination Through Bargaining
When unmatched ﬁrms and workers ﬁrst meet, they begin producing next period in a low-
skill match only if they agree on how to split the expected surplus from their partnership.
This is done by generalized Nash Bargaining with full information where the threat points
are the continuation values from no-agreement — which leaves the worker unemployed, with
value U, and the ﬁrm with a vacancy, valued at Vi. Agreement allows production to begin
in a low-skill match giving the worker W L
i and the ﬁrm JL
i . Clearly, agreement requires a
non-negative return for each agent, W L
i ≥ U and JL
i ≥ Vi. The new match surplus, Si, is
what the pair gains from producing less what they give up, Si ≡ W L
i − U + JL
i − Vi.
The wage paid each period to a worker in a low-skill match in sector i is set eﬃciently to












i ) − Vi]
1−β
where β is the worker’s bargaining power and β ∈ (0,1) so both sides have incentive to
produce. First-order conditions for this maximization imply:
W
L
i − U = βSi; J
L
i − Vi = (1 − β)Si (7)
Therefore, the low-skill wage in sector i, which I derive explicitly later, gives workers
share β, and ﬁrms share (1 − β), of the new match surplus.
9If the match becomes high-skill, the pair once again splits the surplus via Nash Bargaining.
The threat points are the values of continuing production as a low-skill match.16 Deﬁne the
sector i skill premium, SPi, as the incremental surplus generated when moving from a low to

































i = (1 − β)SPi (8)
2.7 Equilibrium

















i=1 and labour {eL
i ,eH
i ,u}I
i=1, such that, in all sectors:
1. Optimality:
(a) Taking job-ﬁlling probabilities and wages as given, ﬁrms maximize expected proﬁt.
(b) Taking job-ﬁnding probabilities and wages as given, workers maximize expected
income.
2. Free Entry and Exit of Vacancies: In all sectors, zero proﬁt conditions hold for
the expected value of posting a vacancy (net of recruiting costs).
3. Nash Bargaining: Generalized Nash Bargaining splits the low and high-skill match
surpluses.
4. Rational Expectations: Firms and workers correctly anticipate transition probabil-
ities, wages and innovation investment.
5. Stationary Labour Distribution: There is a stationary distribution of workers over
employment states.
16Since both agents strictly prefer participating in a low-skill match to being unmatched in equilibrium,
threats to ‘endogenously’ separate the match by either side are not credible.
10A stationary distribution of labour requires that in sector i the ﬂow into unemployment
equals the ﬂow out. Also, the ﬂow of workers into high-skill sector i matches equals the

















i ) + u = 1 (9)







i=1. A representative ﬁrm in each
sector makes two crucial decisions which drive the results. When unmatched, ﬁrms decide
whether to post a vacancy; and once in a low-skill match, ﬁrms decide how much innovation
to undertake. While these actions are sequential, in equilibrium, ﬁrms correctly anticipate the
innovation policies oﬀered once a meeting occurs. Since, the ﬁrm’s vacancy posting decision
takes into account the innovation decision, I discuss the innovation decision ﬁrst.
2.8 Intra-Sectoral Labour Reallocation: The Innovation Eﬀect
Firms in low-skill matches in sector i optimally choose their innovation policies taking as
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= δλi(1 − β)SPi
The LHS is the marginal cost and the RHS is the expected discounted marginal beneﬁt of
increasing innovation. The second equality uses the Nash Bargaining solution, equation (8).
The beneﬁt of innovating is the increase in the arrival rate λi, multiplied by the ﬁrm’s share
(1 − β) of the skill premium — the increased production from becoming a high-skill match
plus the foregone investment costs, because high-skill matches require no further investment.
Proposition 2.1 (Optimal innovation policies) When the innovation investment cost
function is linear, χ(xi) = kixi, a threshold skill arrival rate, λi, characterizes ﬁrms’ in-
novation decisions. The optimal symmetric innovation policy in sector i is:17
17I consider only the symmetric innovation equilibrium. Equilibria may exist where some ﬁrms in a sector



















Firms innovate only if the skill arrival rate is suﬃciently high, λi > λi. Innovation is
increasing in the skill arrival rate and the diﬀerence between high and low-skill productivity.
Innovation is also increasing in the sector-speciﬁc productivity shock, Ai. Therefore, when a
sector’s productivity rises, ﬁrms innovate more. These actions accelerate skill acquisition and
endogenously increase the share of high-skill matches in the sector. As a result, the output
response to the productivity shock is ampliﬁed relative to the baseline model.18 I call this
the ‘innovation eﬀect’.
Conversely, higher interest rates and separation rates reduce innovation. In both cases
ﬁrms discount future payoﬀs more — because borrowing funds is more costly or because jobs
are shorter-lived — so the return to innovating falls. Similarly, as worker’s bargaining power,
β, increases, ﬁrms receive less of the skill premium and therefore innovate less.
Finally, note a few important factors that do not aﬀect the innovation decision. In partic-
ular, innovation does not depend on market tightness and unemployment, so the availability
of new workers is irrelevant for the decision to innovate with existing workers. The ﬁrm’s
innovation decision simply compares the beneﬁt from moving an existing low-skill match to
high-skill, against its cost. In other words, the ﬁrm’s entry decision (pre-match) does not
directly inﬂuence its innovation decision (post-match), because of the timing of events. This
fact simpliﬁes solving the model.
2.9 Inter-Sectoral Labour Reallocation: The Reservation Wage
Eﬀect
Now consider the ﬁrm’s entry decision of whether to post a vacancy. In equilibrium, free














(r + si + λix∗
i)(r + si)
(11)
18In the steady-state, from equation (9), in sector i the ﬂow of workers into high-skill jobs equals the ﬂow
out: λixieL
i = sieH







. Since the ﬁrst fraction is a constant, increasing investment
raises the steady-state ratio of high-to-low skill matches in sector i.
12where π is current period proﬁt. The LHS is the total expected recruiting cost: the per-
period cost, c, times the expected number of periods to ﬁll the vacancy, 1
qi(θ∗
i ). The RHS is
the expected discounted accounting proﬁts earned in a match. Notice this anticipates the
expected gain in value if the match becomes high-skill, which occurs with probability λix∗
i,
when innovation is optimal. In this way, the innovation decision inﬂuences the entry decision.
I derive equilibrium wages using the value functions, equations (1) - (6), the Nash bar-
gaining solutions, equations (7) and (8), and the zero proﬁt conditions Vi = 0 ∀i, giving:
w
L∗




i) − w) (12)
w
H∗
i = w + β(Aip
H
i − w) (13)





Workers receive their reservation wage, w, plus their bargaining power share β of the low
and high-skill per-period match values respectively. The reservation wage is the worker’s
outside option — the value of continuing to search while unemployed, or equivalently, what
the worker foregoes by accepting the job (since there is no on-the-job search). The option
value of search is the unemployment beneﬁts the worker would collect, z, plus the expected
gain in value from accepting a job in a given sector, (W L
i −U), weighted by the probabilities
of receiving oﬀers in these sectors, fi(θi), summed over all sectors and discounted because
production begins next period.
A key diﬀerence relative to the basic one-sector model, is that with multisector search, the
outside option includes the possibility of working in other sectors. As a result, the worker’s
reservation wage updates when market conditions change in other sectors. Sectoral spillovers
occur through this feature of the model, which eﬀectively creates equilibrium linkages in
labour market conditions across diﬀerent sectors.
In addition to receiving their reservation wage, workers also get their share β of the joint
match value, thus verifying the earlier assertion for the value functions that workers accept
all wage oﬀers in equilibrium. The joint match value for low-skill matches is the output
generated, AipL
i , less investment costs, χ(x∗
i), less the worker’s opportunity cost of search, w.
High-skill matches are more valuable, since more output is produced, AipH
i , and there are no
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i = (1 − β)(Aip
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i − w) (15)
Firms receive their bargaining share, (1−β), of the per-period match surplus in low and
high-skill matches respectively. Substituting equilibrium proﬁts into the vacancy posting
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(16)
This ‘reservation wage eﬀect’ leads to sectoral spillovers. For example, positive develop-
ments in one sector raise workers’ reservation wage. As wages are bid up, labour becomes
more expensive, new jobs become less proﬁtable, and job creation falls in other sectors. This
intuition is formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2 (Sector-Speciﬁc Shocks and Equilibrium Market Tightness) A pos-
itive sector-speciﬁc productivity shock in sector i, Ai, causes equilibrium market tightness to
rise in sector i, θ∗
i, and fall in the other sectors, {θ∗
j}I
j =i. Conversely, a negative shock in
sector i, reduces market tightness in that sector and increases market tightness in the other
sectors.
Finally, I give a break-even condition for a sector to engage in recruitment and production:
Proposition 2.3 (Necessary Condition for Sector i Production) Production requires
a non-negative new match surplus, Si ≥ 0. This implies the value of low-skill output net of
investment costs, plus the expected present value of the skill premium, must weakly exceed the
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2.10 Solving the Model
The model is solved in stages. First, I ﬁnd the optimal innovation policies, {x∗
i}I
i=1, using
equations (10). As described above, these solutions are independent of market tightness.
Given these innovation policies, I solve for equilibrium market tightness, {θ∗
i}I
i=1, using equa-
tions (17) below. A key feature of the model is the interdependence of labour market condi-
tions. For example, the decision to post a vacancy in sector i depends on the expected ease
14of ﬁnding a worker, which in turn, depends on the vacancy posting decisions made in other
sectors. The model must therefore be solved simultaneously. Fortunately, the model can be
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] (17)
This expression provides a straight-forward generalization of the basic one-sector model







Solving the system given by (17) yields equilibrium market tightness. Equilibrium wages,
proﬁts and employment shares are found using equations (9) and (12) — (15). Finally,
substituting equilibrium expressions into Proposition 2.3 provides a threshold low-skill output
level for production, yi, to verify a sector’s viability after a productivity shock.
3 Transition Dynamics
The previous section establishes the model’s steady-state properties. A fully-speciﬁed model
of labour adjustment must detail how the economy adjusts when it is out of the steady-state.
Therefore, this section characterizes the model’s transition dynamics between steady-states.
To illustrate, assume the economy is in a steady-state and consider an unanticipated
sector-speciﬁc productivity shock, denoted ˆ Ai,t, that occurs in sector i, at the beginning of
period t, where the hat superscript denotes an updated value. As in the baseline Pissarides
(2000) model, labour contracts are costlessly renegotiated whenever shocks hit the economy.
Therefore, prior to production in period t, existing matches renegotiate low and high-skill
wages using the Nash bargaining solutions described above and ﬁrms update their innovation
policies. In addition, prior to recruitment, unmatched ﬁrms optimally update their vacancy
decisions. Because there is free entry and free disposal of vacancies, the value of a vacancy
is zero for all sectors at all points in time. In Pissarides’ terminology, wages, innovation
investment and market tightness (vacancies) are ‘jump variables’ updating immediately in
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Notice these variables can jump to their new values because they do not depend directly
on employment and unemployment levels. Given these new wages and equilibrium transition
probabilities, the value functions also discretely update in period t. For example, in period
t prior to the shock, the present value of being unemployed is:
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After the shock in period t, the value of unemployment updates immediately to:
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Similarly, the other value functions update to:
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Free entry and exit of vacancies imply ˆ Vi,t = ˆ Vi,t+1 = 0. Nash Bargaining implies ˆ JL
i,t =
(1 − β)ˆ Si,t and ( ˆ W L
i,t − ˆ Ui,t) = β ˆ Si,t, so one can succinctly write the updated joint value of a
low-skill match in sector i as ˆ Si,t = c
(1−β)δqi(ˆ θ∗
i,t) or equivalently:














16Other variables, such as employment and unemployment, evolve more slowly to their new
steady-state values according to the following diﬀerence equations:
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A stable transition requires that each sector’s market tightness updates immediately to
its new steady-state value, ˆ θ∗
i,t. However, since market tightness is θi,t ≡
vi,t
ut , vacancies
overshoot their steady-state level and move in the same direction as unemployment so that
market tightness remains constant at its new steady-state value during the transition. See
Pissarides (1985) or (2000, Ch. 1.7).
4 General versus Sector-Speciﬁc Productivity Shocks
The model results suggest that when a sector’s productivity increases their ﬁrms inno-
vate, investing resources to create more skilled jobs, resulting in intra-sectoral labour real-
location (Proposition 2.1). Furthermore, when relative productivity changes across sectors,
this causes equilibrium wage and recruiting spillovers, resulting in inter-sectoral labour real-
location (Proposition 2.2). This section presents simple quantitative examples to illustrate
these model mechanisms through the innovation and reservation wage eﬀects.
4.1 Quantitative Approach
I compare the model economy’s response to an equal-sized productivity shock in two scenar-
ios. The ﬁrst scenario is a general shock that aﬀects all sectors equally. As a result, there
is intra-sectoral labour reallocation but not inter-sectoral reallocation in the model’s new
steady-state. The second scenario is a sector-speciﬁc shock, which directly aﬀects only one
sector. This results in intra-sectoral reallocation in the sector where the shock occurs as well
as inter-sectoral reallocation between sectors.
17To keep the results transparent and emphasize the model’s adjustment mechanisms, I
parameterize a benchmark economy consisting of two perfectly symmetric sectors. Each sector
uses the same production technologies and each has half of the economy’s employed workers,
of which half are in low-skill and half are in high-skill matches. Table 1 reports the parameter
values for the benchmark model. In these examples, the only parameters that change are the
sector-speciﬁc productivity terms, A1 and A2.
To quantify a reasonable size for the productivity shocks, Table 2 reports summary sta-
tistics using Canadian data for sectoral and aggregate output per worker, expressed in log
deviations from their HP-ﬁltered trends.20 The table shows that productivity is considerably
more volatile at the sectoral level than the aggregate level. In the resource and manufacturing
sectors, productivity is often 3-4 percent or more away from its trend growth. Furthermore,
these deviations from trend are quite persistent with autocorrelations of 0.86 and higher. In
the numerical example, I use 3 percent for the sector-speciﬁc shock. The equivalent-sized
general productivity shock in the two-sector economy is 1.5 percent, since the 3 percent shock
directly aﬀects half of the economy. I assume the shock is unanticipated and permanent.
4.2 Quantitative Results
Table 3 compares the results in the new steady-states following the general productivity
shock to the equal-sized, sector-speciﬁc productivity shock. While the overall diﬀerences for
social welfare are small, there are important distinctions for the sectoral and skill composition
of production, aggregate productivity and the wage distributions.
First, consider the model economy’s response to the general productivity shock. This case
isolates the innovation eﬀect and demonstrates that ﬁrms’ endogenous innovation responses
amplify the impacts of productivity shocks. The productivity shock was an increase of 1.5
percent, however, aggregate output rises by 2.4 percent because the economy invests more
resources in innovation to substitute toward high-skill production (whose share of overall
production increases from 50 percent to 51.2 percent after the shock).
The economy’s response to the sector-speciﬁc productivity shock is quite diﬀerent due to
the asymmetric nature of the shock. The sector-speciﬁc shock raises aggregate output and
output per worker more than the general shock (2.7 percent rather than 2.4 percent). The
reason is that the economy concentrates production in high-skill jobs in the more productive
20Output per worker proxies productivity here because labour is the only factor of production in the model.
18sector, through inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral labour reallocation. While the shock directly
aﬀects Sector 1, there are negative equilibrium wage and hiring spillovers on Sector 2 through
the reservation wage eﬀect. This result is consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings by Beaudry
et al. (2007) who show that changes in the sectoral composition in U.S. cities have equilibrium
spillovers on the level of wages, after controlling for observable characteristics.
The mechanism here works as follows: Firms post vacancies and increase investment in
Sector 1 to take advantage of the now-more-productive workers. The increase in Sector 1
vacancies changes the composition of job postings, making matches with Sector 1 ﬁrms more
likely. These ﬁrms are now more productive and invest more resources in becoming high-skill
to take advantage of the improved productivity. Therefore, workers in Sector 1 generally
receive higher starting wages and also expect to earn high-skill wages sooner because, on
average, they will acquire skills faster in this sector. The value of search for the unemployed
rises because of the improved probability of getting these better paying jobs, pushing up the
reservation wage.
The increase in the reservation wage has second-round equilibrium eﬀects. Wages are
re-bargained in Sector 2 to reﬂect workers’ improved outside option. With more expensive
labour in Sector 2 and no change in the productivity of their workers, these jobs become less
proﬁtable so recruiting falls in this sector. Thus in the new steady-state, the asymmetric
recruiting responses — vacancies rise in Sector 1 and fall in Sector 2 — lead to inter-sectoral
reallocation, shifting labour into the more productive sector. These productivity-enhancing
labour movements between sectors are re-enforced by the shift within the more productive
sector to high-skill matches due to a larger innovation eﬀect after the sector-speciﬁc shock.
Finally, the sector-speciﬁc shock has larger distributional consequences for wages. Relative
to the general shock scenario, high-skill workers in Sector 1 are the major winners and high-
skill workers in Sector 2 are the major losers (as wages rise by 1 percent and fall by 0.9
percent respectively).
Theses eﬀects are steady-state comparisons. Figure 3 shows the transition dynamics to
illustrate the sectoral employment responses. After the sector-speciﬁc shock, the composition
of vacancies shifts immediately and a larger proportion of new hires work in Sector 1 each
period. Over time, employment rises in Sector 1 and falls in Sector 2.
195 Facts from Sectoral Labour Adjustment Episodes
The model describes a general process of sectoral labour adjustment driven by changes
in relative productivities and proﬁtability between and within sectors. This section demon-
strates a key beneﬁt of this general framework — that the model’s predictions are broadly
consistent with the sectoral labour adjustments experienced in several countries that occurred
for disparate reasons. I summarize three important elements of these adjustments regarding
inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral labour reallocation and relative wage eﬀects between low and
high-skill workers.
5.1 Summarizing The Facts
This section presents some new evidence and draws on existing ﬁndings for clearly-deﬁned
events related to persistent relative price shocks (energy prices and exchange rates) and trade
liberalization as well as broader technological change. The key characteristic these events
share, and which the model captures quite well, is that they can change a sector’s production
possibilities and the relative proﬁtability between and within sectors. For example, in sectors
where production possibilities expand and become more proﬁtable, there is increased entry
of new ﬁrms, increased employment in the sector and ﬁrms undertake costly productivity-
enhancing investments to capture the new proﬁt opportunities.
To be more concrete, consider the following examples. Both a reduction in trade barriers
or a rapid exchange rate depreciation eﬀectively improve market access for exporters. They
respond to these new proﬁt opportunities by entering and undertaking investments to improve
their productivity. Similarly, a large increase in energy prices makes resource sector jobs more
proﬁtable, spurring new investments and employment in the sector. At the same time, energy
input costs rise in the manufacturing sector reducing proﬁtability and leading to labour
movements to other sectors. Another example is improvements in computing technologies.
Such improvements disproportionately beneﬁts information-intensive sectors, and because
they increase the relative productivity diﬀerences between low and high-skill workers, ﬁrms
invest in these new technologies and increase the employment share of high-skill workers.
Fact 1: Inter-Sectoral Labour Adjustment
Consider the case of energy price shocks. Figure 4, reproduced from Blanchard and
20Gali (2007), identiﬁes four oil price shocks: 1973, 1979, 1999, and 2002.21 These shocks are a
particularly convenient way to investigate inter-sectoral labour reallocation, because they are
relatively discrete episodes with some persistence. In addition, these shocks can reasonably
be treated as unanticipated and exogenous from the point of view of the economies I study. I
analyze internationally-comparable employment data for the G7 countries (Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K. and U.S.), from the OECD’s Structural Analysis Database.
Figure 5 shows that there is an asymmetric negative impact on manufacturing employment
following oil price shocks. I use the dates identiﬁed by Blanchard and Gali (2007) and
normalize employment to 100 at each shock, so the relative changes are comparable. The
reported results are averaged over the three shocks, since the same trends occur in each
episode (1973, 1979, and 1999).22 In the four years following the oil shocks, there was a
substantial drop in manufacturing employment, which fell by an average of 7.6 percent.
Figure 6 disaggregates the employment dynamics for each country’s manufacturing sector
before and after the oil price shocks. This drop occurred in all countries except Italy, where
employment rose a mere 0.6 percent.23
Conversely, Figure 7 shows that in the four years after the shocks, non-manufacturing
employment continued to grow in all economies, at or only slightly below trend. Not sur-
prisingly, while there is a general increase in employment in the non-manufacturing sectors,
using more detailed data, reveals that the largest employment gains occur in the resource
sector. Figure 8 shows the average response in the U.S. economy after the four oil price
shocks. Figure 9 shows the particularly dramatic response in Canada during the most recent
oil price shock, which Tapp (2007) studies in detail.
These empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the model’s response in Section 4 for the
sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks (comparing Figures 3 and 5) because the increase in the
price of oil raises the proﬁtability of non-manufacturing relative to manufacturing production.
Given that manufacturing production is more energy-intensive, its production costs are more
adversely aﬀected.24
21They deﬁne a shock as an increase in the real oil price of more than 50 percent which persists longer than
four quarters (where the real price is the West Texas Intermediate price deﬂated by the U.S. GDP deﬂator).
22Due to the lag in reporting internationally-comparable employment data, the results for the 2002 shock
are not yet available.
23There are likely two eﬀects at play here. First, manufacturers are the most energy-intensive producers so
their input costs increase more than in other sectors. Second, there is generally an endogenous monetary pol-
icy response which raises interest rates to ﬁght the inﬂationary impacts of the oil price shocks. Manufacturers
and are more sensitive to interest rates as their sales are often ﬁnanced by borrowing.
24This is consistent with ﬁndings by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) who analyze plant-level data within the
21Facts 2 and 3: Intra-Sectoral Labour Adjustment; and Relative Wage Gains for High-Skill
Workers
Not only are there movements of workers between sectors, but often there is a shift from
low to high-skill workers within sectors that become relatively more proﬁtable.
Keane and Prasad (1996) ﬁnd such a shift following rising oil prices, as the relative
employment and wages of high-skill workers rose. These results are found using three proxies
for ‘high-skill’: job tenure; labour force experience; and those with a college degree. They use
individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth covering 1966–
1981 and control for individual ﬁxed eﬀects and sample selection bias. Tapp (2007) also
ﬁnds that wage gains were concentrated in the upper end of the distribution in the Canadian
resource sector following the most recent global commodity price shock (Figure 10).
Verhoogen (2007) studies another important relative price change: the exchange rate.
In 1994, a rapid depreciation of the Mexican peso expanded opportunities for exporters.
Firms responded by increasing the quality of goods produced to export abroad. This, in
turn, resulted in a relative increase in employment and wages of high-skilled workers in the
Mexican manufacturing sector.
Other research in the international trade context provides similar results of so-called,
skill-upgrading. Using detailed plant-level data, Treﬂer (2004) ﬁnds a relative increase in the
employment of high-skill relative to low-skill workers in Canadian manufacturing industries
following the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. For this episode, the relative employment
shift to high-skill workers is associated with investments that increased productivity within
plants, particularly for those that entered export markets after trade liberalization (Lileeva
and Treﬂer, 2007; and Lileeva, 2007). Several other recent papers for a variety of countries
suggest that trade liberalization increases ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in productivity-enhancing
investments (e.g. on-the-job training, R&D, technological adoption) and raises productivity
within plants.25
Finally, similar responses occurred with technological changes from computerization and
general R&D. There were considerable intra-sector employment shifts towards high-skill
labour. These eﬀects were largest in computer-intensive industries, particularly after 1970
(Autor, Katz and Kreuger, 1998). And in the U.K., Haskel and Hayden (1999) ﬁnd most of
manufacturing sector. They ﬁnd larger employment reductions in more energy-intensive plants following oil
price increases.
25See Costantini and Melitz (2007); Aw et al. (2007); and Bustos (2005).
22the aggregate skill upgrading was due to employing more skilled workers within continuing
establishments and was related to computer usage. Similar results hold in the manufactur-
ing sector and are correlated with computer and R&D investment (Berman, Bound, and
Griliches, 1994). Finally, Machin and Reenen (1998) link the within-industry increases in
the proportion of skilled-workers in several OECD countries to broader technological change
through R&D intensity.
The model’s predictions are consistent with these facts. As Section 4 shows, increased
productivity leads to increased innovation investment and larger wage gains for high-skill
workers in the aﬀected sectors. It is straight-forward to show these results analytically.
For the intra-sectoral reallocation result: In the steady-state, from equation (9), in sector












. By Proposition 2.1, innovation investment (the LHS) increases with a sector’s
productivity. Therefore, since the ﬁrst fraction is constant, productivity increases investment
which, in turn, raises the steady-state ratio of high-to-low skill workers in sector i.
In addition, the relative wages of high-skill to low-skill workers rise as productivity in-






This expression is directly increasing in a sector’s productivity Ai, which, in turn, increases
innovation costs, χ(xi), and causes further wage dispersion.
6 Conclusions
This paper presented a general model of sectoral labour reallocation. I demonstrated
that the model’s implications are consistent with the results from several labour adjustment
episodes. The analysis, therefore, suggests that the widely-used search and matching frame-
work is well-suited to tackle, not only the aggregate and distributional issues to which it is
generally applied, but also to study issues at the sectoral level such as labour reallocation.
The model’s transition dynamics are quite tractable, which facilitates taking the model
to the data to study particular labour adjustment episodes. In a related paper, I apply this
model to the data to quantify the aggregate costs of labour adjustment in the Canadian
economy following a global commodity price shock and analyze how labour market policies
aﬀect social welfare, allocations and the speed of adjustment (Tapp, 2007).
There are several potentially interesting extensions to the model, such as comparing the
role of general, sector-speciﬁc and match-speciﬁc skills and adding physical capital.
23Appendix
A Tables
Table 1: Parameter Values for the Benchmark Model
Variable Parameter Value Rationale
Real Interest Rate r 0.33% 4 percent annual
Discount Factor δ 0.997 δ = 1
1+r
Separation Rate, Sector 1 s1 3.4% Shimer (2005)
Separation Rate, Sector 2 s2 3.4% Shimer (2005)
Low-Skill Productivity, Sector 1 pL
1 1.0
Low-Skill Productivity, Sector 2 pL
2 1.0
High-Skill Productivity, Sector 1 pH
1 2.0
High-Skill Productivity, Sector 2 pH
2 2.0
Recruiting Cost c 0.1 Tapp (2007)
Investment Cost Scale, Sector 1 k1 1.0
Investment Cost Scale, Sector 2 k2 1.0
Productivity Shock, Sector 1 A1 1.0 Steady-State
Productivity Shock, Sector 2 A2 1.0 Steady-State
Matching Fx. Scale, Sector 1 µ1 0.13 Sector 1 Employment Share =
1
2
Matching Fx. Scale, Sector 2 µ2 0.13 Sector 2 Employment Share = 1
2
Skill Arrival Rate, Sector 1 λ1 0.11 High-Skill Employment Share = 1
2
Skill Arrival Rate, Sector 2 λ2 0.11 High-Skill Employment Share =
1
2





Matching Function Elasticity α 0.6 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
Workers’ Bargaining Power β 0.5 Equal split of surplus
Model Period = 1 Month
24Table 2: Sectoral and Aggregate Output per Worker, Summary Statistics, Canada,
1987Q1–2001Q4
Resources Manufacturing Aggregate Economy
Standard Deviation 0.043 0.030 0.012
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.86 0.89 0.95
Correlation with Resources 1 0.52 0.30
Correlation with Manufacturing 1 0.53
Correlation with Aggregate Economy 1
Note: All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter of 105.
The results obtained using a smoothing parameter of 1600 are similar. All data are from Cansim. Aggregate,
Resource and Manufacturing output series are seasonally adjusted at annual rates expressed in 1997 constant
dollars: v2036138; v2036146; and v2036171. Aggregate, Resource and Manufacturing Employment series are:
v13682073; v13682076; and v13682079.
25Table 3: Steady-State Impacts of General versus Sector-Speciﬁc Shocks
General Sector-Speciﬁc Sector-Speciﬁc
Aggregate Impacts Benchmark Shock Shock Eﬀect
Social Welfare (a+b-c-d) 100 102.3 102.5 0.2
Social Net Production (a-c-d) 100 102.4 102.6 0.1
a) Output 100 102.4 102.7 0.2
b) Unemployment Beneﬁts 100 98.4 100.6 2.2
c) Innovation Investment Costs 100 102.5 102.7 0.2
d) Recruiting Costs 100 102.8 105.5 2.7
Employment 100 100.1 100.0 -0.2
% High-Skill 50.0 51.2 51.4 0.2
Output per Worker 100 102.3 102.7 0.4
Reservation Wage 100 102.2 102.5 0.2
Unemployment 100 98.4 100.6 2.2
Unemp. Duration (months) 2.4 2.3 2.4 0.1
Sectoral Impacts
Output - Sector 1 100 102.4 124.1 21.7
Sector 2 100 102.4 81.2 -21.2
Employment - Sector 1 100 100.1 118.7 18.6
Sector 2 100 100.1 81.2 -18.9
% High Skill - Sector 1 50.0 51.2 52.3 1.1
Sector 2 50.0 51.2 50.0 -1.2
Proﬁts - Sector 1 100 102.7 128.2 25.5
Sector 2 100 102.7 72.5 -30.2
Market Tightness - Sector 1 100 104.5 151.3 46.8
Sector 2 100 104.5 58.5 -46.0
Distributional Impacts
Low-Skill Wages - Sector 1 100 101.4 101.6 0.1
Sector 2 100 101.4 101.6 0.1
High-Skill Wages - Sector 1 100 101.8 102.8 1.0
Sector 2 100 101.8 100.9 -0.9
Note: Steady-state comparison following unanticipated, permanent productivity shocks which are general versus
sector-speciﬁc. The relevant variables in the benchmark steady-state are normalized to 100. In the Benchmark
model A1 = A2 = 1; General Shock A1 = A2 = 1.015; Sector-Speciﬁc Shock for Sector 1: A1 = 1.03,A2 = 1. The
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Figure 3: Model’s Employment Response After Sector-Speciﬁc Productivity Shock
Benchmark model’s dynamic response to permanent productivity shock to sector 1, A1 = 1.03;A2 = 1.
Figure 4: Log Real Oil Price (1970=100)
Source: Reproduced from Blanchard and Gali (2007), (Figure 3 of their paper). Shading indicates oil price
shocks as deﬁned by 50 percent increase in the real price of oil, sustained for at least four quarters.
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Data Source: OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Database.
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Data Source: OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Database.
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Data Source: OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Database.
Figure 8: Average Employment Response After Oil Shocks, U.S.

































Data Source: Current Employment Statistics (CES) Survey, Resources = Natural Resources and Min-
ing, CES1000000001; Manufacturing CES3000000001; Rest of Economy = Total Nonfarm Employment,
CES0000000001, less Resources and Manufacturing Employment.
30Figure 9: Relative Employment Responses After An Oil Price Shock, Canada



























Source: Cansim, Survey of Employment, Payrolls and Hours (SEPH), seasonally adjusted employment.
Manufacturing v1596771. Mining and oil and gas extraction v1596768. Rest of Economy = Industrial
aggregate excluding unclassiﬁed, v1596764, less manufacturing and mining, oil and gas employment.
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Real Hourly Wage
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Wage Distributions: Resource Sector
Source: Labour Force Survey Public Use Microdata Files. Kernel density estimates of 2001 and 2006 surveys,
Hourly Earnings variable for workers in the Oil & Gas; Forestry; Fishing; and Mining sectors. The solid
line shows 2001, the year prior to the shock; the dashed line shows 2006, the latest available data. I deﬂate
nominal earning using the Consumer Price Index. The estimation applies the Epanenchiknov smoothing
kernel with optimal weights from Silverman (1986).
31C Model Derivations and Proofs of Propositions









i − χ(xi) + δ[siVi + λixiJ
H
i + (1 − si − λixi)J
L
i (xi)] s.t. 0 ≤ xi; xi ≤ 1
The associated optimization problem is:
L = Ai,tpL
i,t − wL
i,t − χ(xi,t) + δEt[siVi,t+1 + λixi,t+1JH
i,t+1 + (1 − si − λixi,t+1)JL
i,t+1(xi,t+1)]
−γ1(−xi,t) − γ2(xi,t − 1)
I focus on stationary innovation policies, where xi,t = xi,t+1. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
are:
∂L
∂xi,t = −χ′(xi,t) + δEt[λi(JH
i,t+1 − JL








γ2 = 1 − xi
There are three cases to consider: the two corner solutions x∗
i = 0,x∗




i = 0. If the ﬁrst constraint holds, x∗
i = 0, so γ1 > 0 by the complementary
slackness condition. The second constraint is satisﬁed, so γ2 = 0. Collecting terms on the ﬁrst
order condition for investment gives:
∂L
∂x∗
i [1−δ(1−si)] = −χ′(xi,t)+δλiEt[(JH
i,t+1−JL
i,t+1)]+γ1.
Given the boundary solution, this expression is non-positive so: χ′(xi,t) ≥ δλiEt[(JH
i,t+1 −
JL
i,t+1)] + γ1. Since γ1 is positive, this implies the marginal investment cost exceeds the
expected marginal beneﬁt at x∗
i = 0.
Case 2: x∗
i = 1. If the second constraint holds, x∗
i = 1, so γ2 > 0 by the complementary
slackness condition. The ﬁrst constraint is satisﬁed, so γ1 = 0. Collecting terms on the ﬁrst
order condition for investment gives: ∂L
∂x∗
i [1−δ(1−si−λi)] = −χ′(xi,t)+δλiEt[(JH
i,t+1−JL
i,t+1)]−
γ2. Given the boundary solution, this expression is non-negative so: δλiEt(JH
i,t+1 − JL
i,t+1) ≥
χ′(xi,t) + γ2. Since γ2 is positive, the expected marginal beneﬁt of investment exceeds the
marginal cost at x∗
i = 1.
Case 3: x∗















For interior solutions, the marginal beneﬁt of investment equals the marginal cost. Sub-
stituting into the ﬁrst order necessary condition for investment using JH
i,t+1 − JL





δ(r+si+λixi) from the Nash Bargaining solution, equation (8), and us-


















Finally, when λi ≤ λi, the skill arrival rate is suﬃciently low so no investment is oﬀered.
32Proof of Proposition 2.2: The sector that received the positive shock is now more
productive, so its surplus from a new match increases. This in turn, means jobs in this sector
are more proﬁtable, so vacancy posting and market tightness increase in this sector.
Now, assume unemployed workers’ reservation wage falls. With cheaper labour, jobs in
all other sectors also become more proﬁtable. Therefore, vacancy posting increases, raising
market tightness in these other sectors, {θ∗
j}I
j =i. The reservation wage can be expressed as




i θi. Therefore, because z,c,β are ﬁxed, the reservation wage would increase.
However, this contradicts the original assumption that the reservation wage falls.
Thus, it must be the case that following a positive productivity shock in sector i, workers’
reservation wage increases. Jobs in the other sectors are therefore less proﬁtable at the higher
wage, so from the zero proﬁt conditions, the RHS of equation (16) falls. For the zero proﬁt
condition to hold in the new equilibrium, ﬁrms expected recruiting costs must also fall — the
LHS of equation (16). Given the cost of a vacancy, c, is ﬁxed, the job ﬁlling rates in these
other sectors must increase, {q(θj)}I




The same argument applies after a negative shock in sector i, but in the opposite direction.
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
The social present value of a low-skill match is Si = W L
i −U +JL
i −Vi. The skill premium




i . Using the worker’s
and ﬁrm’s value functions, equations (1) – (6), and the free entry/zero proﬁt condition,
Vi = 0, gives an expression for low-skill match surplus:
Si = Aip
L





i − U) + δλixiSPi + δ(1 − si)Si (18)
Substituting in for the worker’s reservation wage, ¯ w = z + δ
PI
i fi(θi)(W L
i − U), and
rearranging using δ = 1
1+r, gives:
δ(r + si)Si = Aip
L
i − χ(xi) − ¯ w + δλixiSPi
Production requires the match surplus be non-negative, Si ≥ 0. This implies the value of
low-skill output, net of investment costs, plus the expected present value of the skill premium
covers the worker’s reservation wage:
Aip
L
i − χ(xi) + δλixiSPi ≥ ¯ w
Corollary of Propositions 2.1 and 2.3:












(r + si + λix∗
i)
< ¯ w
Case 2) A given sector produces only low-skill output if:
i) y
L
i ≥ ¯ w & ii) λi ≤ λi












(r + si + λix∗
i)
≥ ¯ w & ii) λi > λi









Derivation of Equilibrium Wages:
Low-Skill Wage in Sector i: From (18) as described above, the low-skill match surplus
can be expressed as:
Si = Aip
L





i − U) + δλixiSPi + δ(1 − si)Si (19)















i = (1 − β)Si, and JH
i − JL
i = (1 − β)SPi from the Nash Bargaining
solutions, equations (7) and (8), gives another expression in the low-skill surplus:




i − χ(xi) + δλixi(1 − β)SPi + δ(1 − si)(1 − β)Si (20)
Multiplying (19) by (1 − β) gives:
(1 − β)Si = (1 − β)[Aip
L





i − U) + δλixiSPi + δ(1 − si)Si] (21)
Equating the RHS of (20) and (21) and simplifying gives the equilibrium low-skill wage
in sector i, equation (12) in the paper:
w
L∗












High-Skill Wage in Sector i:














Using the fact that δ =
1
1+r and simplifying gives:









Substituting in W H
i − W L
i = βSPi from the Nash Bargaining solution, (8) gives:





34Then explicitly solve for the skill premium using the worker’s and ﬁrm’s value functions,





i ) + χ(xi)
δ(r + si + λixi)
(23)
Substituting into (22) for the skill premium and the low-skill wage and simplifying gives
the high-skill wage in sector i, equation (13) in the paper:
w
H∗
i = w + β(Aip
H
i − w)





Equilibrium System of Equations in Market Tightness:
Using the zero proﬁt condition, Vi = 0 in the ﬁrm’s value of a vacancy equation, (4), gives
JL
i = c
δqi(θi). From the ﬁrm’s Nash Bargaining, (7), (1 − β)Si = JL
i . So,
(1 − β)Si =
c
δqi(θi)
Substitute in for (1 − β)Si using (21):
(1 − β)[Aip
L





i − U) + δλixiSPi + δ(1 − si)Si] =
c
δqi(θi)
Use the worker’s Nash Bargaining solution, (7), βSi = W L
















Use the fact that fi(θi) = θiqi(θi) and
1
δ = 1 + r to get:
(1 − β)[Aip
L








Divide both sides by c, substitute in for the skill premium, SPi, from (23) and rearrange
to get the equilibrium system of equations in {θi}I


















i ) + χ(x∗
i)
r + si + λix∗
i
]
35D Model Extension: Directed Search
One potential objection to the model formulation is that since jobs in more productive sectors
pay higher wages and workers have full information, they may direct their search to these
high-wage sectors rather than apply for jobs in all sectors. The model can easily be amended
to give workers the option of directing their search to a particular sector.
To simplify the analysis and highlight the main results, I ignore innovation investment
and assume workers can costlessly switch their job search between sectors at the beginning
of each period, but can only apply to one sector per period. While the value functions for
ﬁrms are essentially unchanged, workers’ value functions become:
Ui = z + δ[fi(θi)Wi + (1 − fi(θi))Ui] (24)
Wi = wi + δ[siUi + (1 − si)Wi] (25)
There are equilibria where some sectors do not produce because no workers apply for jobs.
For practical applications, the relevant equilibrium features production in all sectors under
study. In this case, workers must be indiﬀerent between search in any sector, i.e. Ui = U ∀i.
Since the expected present value of searching in each sector must be the same, considering
sectors i and j:
U = z + δ[fi(θi)Wi + (1 − fi(θi))U] = z + δ[fj(θj)Wj + (1 − fj(θj))U]
Nash Bargaining implies Wi − U = βSi, therefore the above expression simpliﬁes to:
⇒ fi(θi)Si = fj(θj)Sj
More productive sectors have a higher match surplus, Si, so they pay workers higher
wages. In equilibrium, however, workers take longer to ﬁnd a job in these sectors, because
fi(θi) is lower.26
26Wages are given as before by: w∗
i = w + β(Aipi − w) except now the worker’s reservation wage is:
w = z + δfi(θ∗
i )(Wi − U). From above, workers reservation wages are the same in each sector, so more
productive sectors pay higher wages, pi > pj ⇒ wi > wj.
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